[RADIATOR] iPhones and SSL certificates

Heikki Vatiainen hvn at open.com.au
Thu Sep 12 13:19:45 UTC 2019

On 11/09/2019 1.00, Hirayama, Pat wrote:

> Certificate is presented to iPhone user as "Not trusted".
> And yes, I know "Not trusted" isn't necessarily an error.  On the
> other hand, if I train users to just ignore this error, then, they
> get used to ignoring other warning messages ....

Yes, I agree with this. When compared to HTTPS, the browser knows the 
name of server it should be talking to; with Wi-Fi, the information 
about expected server certificate has to come from somewhere else.

> And I don't really have a Mac MDM system to push the cert onto
> everyone's iPhones -- not that I necessarily want to be touching
> people's devices.

To freshen my memory I took a look at what the "Not Trusted" dialog. It 
does show the server name and issuing CA name, but it's hard to tell to 
which root CA the certificate chain leads to. In other words, good 
instructions with screenshots are likely not enough.

> Any other ideas or suggestions, or am I just going to have to accept
> that iPhones will just claim "Not trusted"?  I know that if they
> trust the certificate ... it'll happen again the next time I renew
> the certificate as well.

If you do not want to touch, in serviced fashion, people's devices, 
would a self service model with clear instructions with a downloadable 
profile be an option?

In other words: the profiles created with Apple Configurator 2 are XML 
files that can be made available on a web server. They can even be sent 
by email, but installing profiles from email attchment sounds risky.

Assuming profiles on web server, Safri launces a dialog for installing a 
profile. The profile must then be separately accepted, so instructions 
would be needed, but there's no need to have the devices physically 
serviced anywhere.

As an advanced step: Because the profiles are XML, they could be 
generated per user to have a Wi-Fi specific username/password created 
for each user. A colleaque mentioned it would even be possible to embed 
a PKCS12 blob with a certificate and a private key to enable EAP-TLS 


Heikki Vatiainen <hvn at open.com.au>

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